Evaluating Unemployment Policies: What do the Underlying Theories Tell Us?

Dennis Snower

No 1081, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The paper surveys unemployment policies for advanced market economies and evaluates them by examining the predictions of the underlying macroeconomic theories. The basic idea is that, for the most part, different unemployment policy prescriptions rest on different macroeconomic theories, and our confidence in the prescriptions should depend - at least in part - on the ability of these theories to predict some salient stylized facts about unemployment behaviour. The paper considers four types of policies: laissez-faire, demand-management, supply-side, and structural.

Keywords: Demand Management; Laissez Faire; Structural Policies; Supply-Side Policies; Unemployment; Unemployment Policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E32 E63 J21 J23 J32 J41 J51 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994-12
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Journal Article: Evaluating Unemployment Policies: What Do the Underlying Theories Tell Us? (1995)
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