The Adverse Effect of Information on Governance and Leverage

Lóránth, Gyöngyi, Alan Morrison and Christian Laux

No 11345, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study the effect that internal information systems have upon a firm’s leverage and corporate governance choices. Information systems lower governance costs by facilitating more targeted interventions. But they also generate asymmetric information between firms and their investors. As a result, firms may attempt to signal their superior quality by assuming more leverage. In some circumstances, this can reduce governance incentives and result in inferior outcomes. Investors anticipate this effect, and it renders information systems inefficient.

Date: 2016-06
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