Federal Fiscal Constitutions. Part II: Risk Sharing and Redistribution

Torsten Persson () and Guido Tabellini

No 1142, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: The paper studies the political and economic determinants of inter-regional public transfers. It points to an important difference between two alternative federal fiscal constitutions. The paper shows that inter-regional transfers can be determined either by a federation-wide vote over a centralized social insurance system, or by bargaining over intergovernmental transfers. When regions are asymmetric, the federal social insurance system leads to a larger fiscal programme.

Keywords: Fiscal Federalism; Redistribution; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995-02
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1142 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1142

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=1142

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().