Endogenous Distortions in Product and Labour Markets

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini

No 1143, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper uses the common agency approach to analyse the joint determination of product and labour market distortions in a small (developing) open economy. Capital owners and union members lobby the government on both tariffs and minimum wages, while other factors of production are not organized. The paper shows that product and labour market distortions move in the same direction in response to changes in economic and political parameters, and that their level is not modified by social pacts between capital and labour. It also shows that conditionality by foreign agencies should target product market distortions, not labour market distortions.

Keywords: Lobbying; Minimum Wage; Social Pact (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F10 J00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995-02
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1143 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Endogenous distortions in product and labor markets (1995)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1143

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=1143

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().