Designing Institutions for International Monetary Policy Coordination

Atilano Jorge Padilla
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio J Morales ()

No 1180, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: In this paper we study the adjustment of a N-country world economy to an unfavourable common supply shock. We show that world-wide monetary policy coordination is essential to achieve an optimal adjustment to the common shock, but that its actual implementation requires careful design to ensure that each country finds it optimal to join and to remain faithful to the coordination agreement. We then construct alternative coordination mechanisms which implement the first-best response to the common shock, discuss their main properties and rank them according to different criteria of desirability.

Keywords: Coordination; EMU; Institutions; Majority Voting; Mechanism Design; Monetary Unions; Open Economy; Strategic Conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 E61 F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1180 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: Designing Institutions for International Monetary Policy Coordination (1995)
Working Paper: Designing Institutions for International Monetary Policy Coordination (1995)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1180

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=1180

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().