Institutions and Managerial Task Allocation: Evidence from Chinese Entrepreneurs

Cheng-Gang Xu, Di Guo and Kun Jiang

No 11853, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This study presents theoretical and empirical analyses of time allocation of entrepreneurs as a response to weak property rights protection. Using a nationwide random sampling survey of more than 3,000 entrepreneurs in over 100 cities in China, we find that entrepreneurs, responding to the violation of property rights, spend large proportions of their working time on lobbying activities to protect their businesses at the cost of management time. Moreover, the sensitivity of lobbying time to property rights protection is reduced if the entrepreneur is politically connected or if the firm is larger or older.

Keywords: Institution; Property rights; entrepreneurship; Time allocation; Chinese economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L26 M12 O12 P31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna, nep-ent and nep-tra
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP11853 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Institutions and Managerial Task Allocation: Evidence from Chinese Entrepreneurs (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11853

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP11853

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().