Monetary Policy at Work: Security and Credit Application Registers Evidence

Andrea Polo, Peydró, José-Luis and Enrico Sette
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jose-Luis Peydro

No 12011, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Monetary policy transmission may be impaired if banks rebalance their portfolios towards securities to e.g. risk-shift or hoard liquidity. We identify the bank lending and risk-taking channels by exploiting – Italian’s unique – credit and security registers. In crisis times, with higher ECB liquidity, less capitalized banks react by increasing securities over credit supply, inducing worse firm-level real effects. However, they buy securities with lower yields and haircuts, thus reaching-for-safety and liquidity. Differently, in pre-crisis time, securities do not crowd-out credit supply. The substitution from lending to securities in crisis times helps less capitalized banks to repair their balance-sheets and then restart credit supply with a one year-lag.

Keywords: Monetary policy; Euro area sovereign debt crisis; Lehman crisis; Securities; Credit; Bank capital; Reach-for-yield; Held to maturity; Available for sale; Trading book (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 G01 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (43)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Monetary policy at work: Security and credit application registers evidence (2021)
Working Paper: Monetary Policy at Work: Security and Credit Application Registers Evidence (2020)
Working Paper: Monetary policy at work: Security and credit application registers evidence (2018)
Working Paper: Monetary policy at work: Security and credit application registers evidence (2017)
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