Media See-saws: Winners and Losers in Platform Markets

Martin Peitz and Simon Anderson

No 12214, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We customize the aggregative game approach to oligopoly to study media platforms which may differ by popularity. Advertiser, platform, and consumer surplus are tied together by a simple summary statistic. When media are ad-financed and ads are a nuisance to consumers we establish see-saws between consumers and advertisers. Entry increases consumer surplus, but decreases advertiser surplus if industry platform profits decrease with entry. Merger decreases consumer surplus, but advertiser surplus tends to increase. By contrast, when platforms use two-sided pricing or consumers like advertising, advertiser and consumer interests are often aligned.

Keywords: Media economics; Mergers; Entry; Advertising; Aggregative games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cul, nep-ind, nep-mic, nep-mkt and nep-pay
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Media see-saws: Winners and losers in platform markets (2020)
Working Paper: Media See-Saws: Winners and Losers in Platform Markets (2019)
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