Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union

Roel Beetsma and Lans Bovenberg

No 1303, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper explores under what conditions a European Monetary Union (EMU) is an optimum currency area. The scope for an EMU increases with convergence of structural and fiscal policies, small money holdings, a conservative European Central Bank, and dependent national central banks. How national policies affect the rest of the Union once the EMU has been formed is also investigated. The case for surveillance of national structural and fiscal policies appears to depend largely on monetary arrangements in the Union.

Keywords: Convergence; European Central Bank; European Monetary Union; Inflation Aversion; Optimal Institutions; Structural Policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 E61 E62 F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union (2000)
Working Paper: Designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a European Monetary Union (1996)
Working Paper: Designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a European Monetary Union (1995)
Working Paper: Designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a European Monetary Union (1995)
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