A Nazi †Killer†Amendment

Benny Moldovanu ()

No 13260, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study killer amendments under various informational regimes and postulated voter behavior. In particular, the success chances of killer amendments are shown to differ across several well-known binary, sequential voting procedures. In light of this theory, we describe a remarkable instance of a motion-proposing and agenda-setting strategy by the Nazi party, NSDAP, during the Weimar Republic. Their purpose was to kill a motion of toleration of the new 1928 Government, and they were supported by their fiercest enemies on the far left, the communist party. The combined killer strategy was bound to be successful, but it ultimately failed because of another agenda-setting counter-move undertaken by the Reichstag president.

Date: 2018-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-his
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP13260 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13260

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP13260

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().