Incentives for Information Provision: Energy Efficiency in the Spanish Rental Market

Natalia Fabra and Xueying Bian

No 13270, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We build a search model with asymmetric information regarding houses´ energy efficiency. The objective is to shed light on the house owners` incentives to obtain and disclose energy certificates (ECs) in the rental market. Such incentives depend not only on the rent premium for more efficient houses - as has been widely documented - but also on the rent penalty for unlabeled houses. Interestingly, we show that such a penalty is higher the greater the disclosure rate of ECs. The theoretical predictions are empirically quantified in the context of the Spanish rental market.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Energy efficiency; Adoption rate; Rental market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-reg and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Incentives for information provision: Energy efficiency in the Spanish rental market (2020)
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