Efficiency Wages Versus Insiders and Outsiders

Assar Lindbeck and Dennis Snower

No 133, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper compares two theories of involuntary unemployment: the efficiency-wage theory and the insider-outsider theory. We indicate that one of the central problems in providing microfoundations for the existence of involuntary unemployment is to explain why there is no underbidding, and we compare the two theories in this contex.

Keywords: Efficiency Wages; Insiders; Outsiders; Underbidding; Unemployment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1986-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Chapter: Efficiency Wages Versus Insiders and Outsiders (1987)
Journal Article: Efficiency wages versus insiders and outsiders (1987)
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