Information Aggregation in Emissions Markets with Abatement

Estelle Cantillon and Aurélie Slechten

No 13343, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: A key policy argument in favor of emissions markets (relative to command-and-control types of regulation) is their ability to aggregate dispersed information and generate price signals to guide rms' trading and abatement decisions. We investigate this argument in a multi-period model where rms receive noisy private signals about their current period emissions and privately observe their previous period emissions before this information is made public to the rest of the market. Firms respond to information by trading and abating emissions. We show that there exists a rational expectations equilibrium that fully aggregates rms' private information, justifying the policy argument in favor of emissions markets, in the absence of other frictions. We also derive predictions about how prices should be reacting to new private or public information and show that the possibility of abatement dampens the impact of shocks on prices. Finally, we show that the information aggregation result breaks down if rms' abatement costs are also private information.

Keywords: Information aggregation; Efficient market hypothesis; Price formation; Emissions trading (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 D84 D85 G14 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Information Aggregation in Emissions Markets with Abatement (2018)
Working Paper: Information Aggregation in Emissions Markets with Abatement (2018)
Working Paper: Information Aggregation in Emissions Markets with Abatement (2018)
Working Paper: Information Aggregation in Emissions Markets with Abatement (2018)
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