Experimentation, Learning, and Preemption

Emre Ozdenoren, Heidrun Hoppe-Wewetzer and Georgios Katsenos

No 13483, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper offers a model of experimentation and learning with uncertain outcomes as suggested by Arrow (1969). Investigating a two-player stopping game, we show that competition leads to less experimentation, which extends existing results for preemption games to the context of experimentation with uncertain outcomes. Furthermore, we inquire about the extent of experimentation under two information settings: when the researchers share information about the outcomes of their experiments and when they do not share such information. We discover that the sharing of information can generate more experimentation and higher value for a relatively wide range of parameters. We trace this finding to the stronger ability to coordinate on the information obtained through experimentation when it is shared. Our model allows to shed light on recent criticism of the current scientific system.

JEL-codes: D83 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP13483 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13483

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP13483

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().