Anticompetitive Vertical Merger Waves

Jerome Pouyet, Johan Hombert and Nicolas Schutz

No 13671, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We develop a model of vertical merger waves and use it to study the optimal merger policy. As a merger wave can result in partial foreclosure, it can be optimal to ban a vertical merger that eliminates the last unintegrated upstream firm. Such a merger is more likely to worsen market performance when the number of downstream firms is large relative to the number of upstream firms, and when upstream contracts are non-discriminatory, linear, and public. On the other hand, the optimal merger policy can be non-monotonic in the strength of synergies or in the degree of downstream product differentiation.

Date: 2019-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Anticompetitive Vertical Merger Waves (2020)
Journal Article: Anticompetitive Vertical Merger Waves (2019)
Working Paper: Anticompetitive Vertical Merger Waves (2019)
Working Paper: Anticompetitive Vertical Merger Waves (2013)
Working Paper: Anticompetitive vertical mergers waves (2009)
Working Paper: Anticompetitive vertical mergers waves (2009)
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