Divided Government, Delegation, and Civil Service Reform

Massimo Morelli, Elliott Ash and Matia Vannoni

No 13878, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper sheds new light on the drivers of civil service reform in U.S. states. We first demonstrate theoretically that divided government is a key trigger of civil service reform, providing nuanced predictions for specific configurations of divided government. We then show empirical evidence for these predictions using data from the second half of the 20th century: states tended to introduce these reforms under divided government, and in particular when legislative chambers (rather than legislature and governor) were divided.

Date: 2019-07
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Journal Article: Divided government, delegation, and civil service reform (2022)
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