Politsplaining: Populism Breeds Populism

Hans Gersbach and Köhler-Schindler, Laurin

No 13919, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We define politsplaining as a particular form of populist discourse, wherein politicians offer strategically simplified explanations of complex phenomena, attributing causes and proposing remedies that best serve their political aims. We construct a formal model in which two candidates compete for office, while citizens' incomes are shaped by two shocks|such as automation and globalization. Citizens, however, observe only the aggregate effect of these shocks, without discerning their origins. Through politsplaining, a candidate reshapes public beliefs about income shocks within Bayesian plausibility. This process may generate inefficient policies targeting misidentified problems and compel both candidates to adopt mutually reinforcing populist positions, undermining welfare.

Keywords: Populism; Elections; Politsplaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 D83 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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