The Political Economy of the Prussian Three-class Franchise

Sascha Becker and Erik Hornung

No 13930, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Did the Prussian three-class franchise, which politically over-represented the economic elite, affect policy-making? Combining MP-level political orientation, derived from all roll call votes in the Prussian parliament (1867–1903), with constituency characteristics, we analyze how local vote inequality, determined by tax payments, affected policy-making during Prussia's period of rapid industrialization. Contrary to the predominant view that the franchise system produced a conservative parliament, higher vote inequality is associated with more liberal voting, especially in regions with large-scale industry. We argue that industrialists preferred self-serving liberal policies and were able to coordinate on suitable MPs when vote inequality was high.

Keywords: Inequality; Political economy; Three-class franchise; Elites; Prussia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 N43 N93 P26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-his and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Political Economy of the Prussian Three-Class Franchise (2020)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of the Prussian Three-Class Franchise (2019)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of the Prussian Three-class Franchise (2019)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of the Prussian Three-class Franchise (2019)
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