Acquisition for Sleep

Lars Persson, Norbäck, Pehr-Johan and Charlotta Olofsson
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Pehr-Johan Norbäck

No 14172, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Within the policy debate, there is a fear that large incumbent firms buy small firms' inventions to ensure that they are not used in the market. We show that such "acquisitions for sleep" can occur if and only if the quality of a process invention is small; otherwise, the entry profit will be higher than the entry-deterring value. We then show that the incentive for acquiring for the purpose of putting a patent to sleep decreases when the intellectual property law is stricter because the profit for the entrant then increases more than the entry-deterring value does.

Keywords: Acquisitions; Innovation; Sleeping patents; Ip law; Ownership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G24 L1 L2 M13 O3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-sbm and nep-tid
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP14172 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Acquisitions for Sleep (2020)
Journal Article: Acquisitions for Sleep (2020)
Working Paper: Acquisition for Sleep (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14172

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP14172

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().