Interpreting the ERM Crisis: Country-Specific and Systemic Issues

Willem Buiter, Giancarlo Corsetti and Paolo Pesenti

No 1466, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Most interpretations of the Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis of 1992/3 ignore the key role played by structural policy spillovers among European countries, and overlook the effects of coordination (or lack thereof) of monetary and exchange rate policies among the countries making up the periphery of the system. This paper provides a simple analytical framework, able to encompass the recent literature on currency crises, while developing it by bringing out the decisive role of the strategic interactions among national policy-makers in a multi-country monetary and exchange rate game. In contrast to an approach that focuses exclusively on country-specific issues, a systemic view is ultimately able to unravel more coherently, and more convincingly, the ‘puzzles’ of the ERM crisis.

Keywords: ERM; Monetary Policy Coordination; Systemic Crises (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F31 F32 F33 F41 F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Interpreting the ERM Crisis: Country-Specific and Systemic Issues (1998)
Working Paper: Interpreting the ERM Crisis: Country-Specific and Systemic Issues (1997)
Working Paper: Interpreting the ERM crisis: country-specific and systemic issues (1997)
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