Optimal Checks and Balances Under Policy Uncertainty

Massimo Morelli and Gabriele Gratton

No 14745, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Political checks and balances are certainly among the most debated desiderata in the construction of democratic systems and their evaluation. This paper suggests a conceptual framework that could be useful to inform this debate. We propose a model where the pros and cons of a strengthening of checks and balances are respectively the reduction of type-I errors and the increase of potential type-II errors in policy decision-making. Checks and balances are less desirable for intermediate levels of competence of the political class and more desirable when the bureaucracy is slower or when the political system involves frequent turnover, and in policy areas where the welfare effects of a reform are harder to evaluate and effective accountability is low.

Keywords: Checks and balances; Information; Uncertain policy quality; Effective accountability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: OPTIMAL CHECKS AND BALANCES UNDER POLICY UNCERTAINTY (2022)
Working Paper: Optimal Checks and Balances Under Policy Uncertainty (2021)
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