The Social Value of Debt in the Market for Corporate Control

Mike Burkart, Samuel Lee and Henrik Petri

No 15249, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: How should bidders fi nance tender offers when the objective of the takeover is to improve incentives? In such a setting, debt fi nance has bene fits even when bidders have deep pockets: It ampli es incentive gains, imposes Pareto sharing on bidders and free-riding target shareholders, and makes bidding competition more efficient. High leverage, independent of fi nancing needs, can be privately and socially optimal. Although takeover debt dilutes target shareholders, they may benefi t most from it, especially when bidding is competitive.

Keywords: Tender offers; Free-riding; Debt financing; Debt overhang; Equity dilution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn and nep-com
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