To be (Unionized) or Not to be? A Case for Cost-raising Strategies

Jacques Bughin and Stefano Vannini

No 1527, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper analyses the decision by a firm over whether or not to recognize unions (and therefore enter the bargaining process) in order to gain market power in unionized markets. We show that union power coupled with the nature of the union-firm bargaining process - i.e. scope and structure - are key determinants of a firm’s choice to be unionized and to strategically adopt cost-raising strategies.

Keywords: Cost-raising Strategies; Union-Firm Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J51 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: To be (unionized) or not to be? A Case for Cost-Raising Strategies (1996)
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