Abstentions and Social Networks in Congress

Marco Battaglini, Valerio Leone Sciabolazza and Eleonora Patacchini

No 15270, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study the extent to which personal connections among legislators influence abstentions in the U.S. Congress. Our analysis is conducted by observing representatives' abstention for the universe of roll call votes held on bills in the 109th-113th Congresses. Our results show that a legislator's propensity to abstain increases when the majority of his or her alumni connections abstains, even after controlling for other well-known predictors of abstention choices and a vast set of fixed effects. We further reveal that a legislator is more prone to abstain than to take sides when the demands from personal connections conflict with those of the legislator's party.

Keywords: Abstention; U.s. congress; Social Networks; Alumni networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-net and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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