Shipwrecked by Rents

Mark Koyama, Fernando Arteaga and Desiree Desierto

No 15300, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: The trade route between Manila and Mexico was a monopoly of the Spanish Crown for more than 250 years. The Manila Galleons were ``the richest ships in all the oceans'', but much of the wealth sank at sea and remain undiscovered. We introduce a newly constructed dataset of all of the ships that travelled this route. We show formally how monopoly rents that allowed widespread bribe-taking would have led to overloading and late ship departure, thereby increasing the probability of shipwreck. Empirically, we demonstrate not only that these late and overloaded ships were more likely to experience shipwrecks or to return to port, but that such effect is stronger for galleons carrying more valuable, higher-rent, cargo. This sheds new light on the costs of rent-seeking in European colonial empires.

Keywords: Corruption; Rent-seeking; Bribery; Shipwrecks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K00 N00 N13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP15300 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Shipwrecked by rents (2024)
Working Paper: Shipwrecked by Rents (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15300

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP15300

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().