Dynastic Control without Ownership: Evidence from Post-war Japan

Morten Bennedsen, Vikas Mehrotra, Jungwook Shim and Yupana Wiwattanakantang ()

No 15398, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Dynastic-controlled firms are led by founding family CEOs while the family owns an insignificant share of equity (defined as less than five percent). They represent 7.4% of listed firms in post-war Japan, include well-known firms such as Casio, Suzuki and Toyota, and are often grouped with widely-held firms in the literature. These firms differ in key performance measures from both traditional family firms and non-family firms, and evolve from the former as equity-financed growth dilutes the founding family’s ownership over time. In turn, the transition from dynastic control to non-family status is driven by a diminution of strategic family resources.

Keywords: Family control; Ownership; Succession (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 L26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-cfn
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