A Refunding Scheme to Incentivize Narrow-Spectrum Antibiotic Development

Hans Gersbach and Böttcher, Lucas

No 15512, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Starting from a general framework for the study of antibiotic-resistance, we introduce a market-based refunding scheme that incentivizes companies to develop antibiotics against resistant bacteria and, in particular, narrow-spectrum antibiotics that target specific resistant bacterial strains. Successful companies can claim a refund from a newly-established antibiotics fund that partially covers their development costs. The refund involves a fixed and variable part. The latter increases with the use of the new antibiotic for resistant strains-the "resistance premium"-and it decreases with the use for non-resistant bacteria-the "non-resistance penalty". We outline how such a refunding scheme can solve the so-called "antibiotics dilemma", which states that new antibiotics against resistant bacteria are of high societal value, but unattractive for companies, since sales are low. We illustrate that the refunding scheme can cope with various sources of R&D uncertainty and we discuss how the antibiotics fund could be financed.

Keywords: Antibiotic-resistance; -; antibiotics; dilemma; -; r&d; incentives; -; refunding; scheme; -; narrow-spectrum; antibiotics; -; r&d; uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 H20 I10 L65 O30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-12
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP15512 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15512

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP15512

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().