The voting premium

Nadya Malenko, Doron Levit and Ernst Maug

No 15718, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper develops a theory of blockholder governance and the voting premium. A blockholder and dispersed shareholders first trade in a competitive market and then vote at a shareholder meeting. A positive voting premium emerges only if the blockholder is not the median voter, since he is then willing to pay a higher price to move the median voter in his preferred direction. Hence, the voting premium does not emerge from exercising control, but from influencing who exercises control. Empirical measures of the voting premium generally do not reflect the economic value of voting rights to the blockholder, and the voting premium is unrelated to measures of voting power, such as the probability of being pivotal. A negative voting premium can emerge in situations when dispersed shareholders could free-ride on the blockholder's trades.

Keywords: Voting; Trading; Voting premium; Blockholders; Ownership structure; Shareholder rights; Corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 D82 D83 G34 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: The Voting Premium (2023)
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