Better Alone? Evidence on the Costs of Intermunicipal Cooperation

Clemence Tricaud

No 15999, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper provides new evidence on why municipalities are often reluctant to integrate. Exploiting a French reform that made intermunicipal cooperation mandatory, I find that urban municipalities forced to integrate experienced a large increase in construction, consistent with NIMBYism explaining their resistance, while rural municipalities ended up with fewer local public services. I do not find the same effects for municipalities that had voluntarily integrated prior to the law, while both types of municipality enjoyed similar benefits in terms of public transport and fiscal revenues. These findings support the fact that municipalities resisted to avoid the local costs of integration.

Keywords: Local governments; Intermunicipal cooperation; Difference-in-differences; Housing regulations; Local public services (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H70 R52 R53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Better Alone? Evidence on the Costs of Intermunicipal Cooperation (2021)
Working Paper: Better Alone? Evidence on the Costs of Intermunicipal Cooperation (2021)
Working Paper: Better Alone? Evidence on the Costs of Intermunicipal Cooperation (2021)
Working Paper: Better Alone? Evidence on the Costs of Intermunicipal Cooperation (2021)
Working Paper: Better Alone? Evidence on the Costs of Intermunicipal Cooperation (2021)
Working Paper: Better alone? Evidence on the costs of intermunicipal cooperation (2019)
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