The Development of the Division of Power among the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament

Annick Laruelle () and Mika Widgrén

No 1600, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Probabilistic measures of a priori voting power are useful tools to asses actors' influence on collective decision-making either for the purpose of designing a voting organ or to model particular policy cases. This paper makes an attempt to reduce a dynamic voting process into a cooperative voting game and uses the EU as an example. We propose a probabilistic reduced extensive form voting game. By subsequent specialization of power indices we are able to quantify, for example, to what extent the development of the decision-making procedures on the EU has changed the division of power among its main organs.

Keywords: EU; Game Theory; Inter-governmental Conference; Voting Power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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