The Stability Pact: Safeguarding the Credibility of the European Central Bank

Michael Artis and Bernhard Winkler

No 1688, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: The ‘Stability Pact’ agreed at the Dublin Summit in December 1996 and concluded at the Amsterdam European Council in June 1997 prescribes sanctions for countries that breach the Maastricht deficit ceiling in stage three of European Monetary Union. This paper explores possible motivations for the Stability Pact as an incentive device for fiscal discipline and as a partial substitute for policy coordination and a common ‘stability culture’.

Keywords: Incentive Contracts; Maastricht Treaty; Monetary Union; Policy Coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 E61 F33 F36 F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (51)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1688 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Stability Pact: Safeguarding the Credibility of the European Central Bank (1998)
Journal Article: The Stability Pact: Safeguarding the Credibility of the European Central Bank (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1688

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=1688

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().