Three Sins: The Disconnect Between de jure Institutions and de facto Power in Afghanistan

Michael Callen

No 17226, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Three key issues that would plague the Afghan government were woven into its fabric from the beginning. First, the Afghan government initiated at the Bonn conference in 2001 explicitly excluded the Taliban. This is widely argued to be the `original sin' that stymied subsequent political development. This exclusionary decision gave the Taliban and their supporters no choice other than to sustain violent conflict, deepen ties to Pakistan, and seek more favourable terms or an outright victory. This was not the only sin. Second, the government adopted an electoral system that combined large multi-member districts with a single non-transferable vote (SNTV). This obscure system is used almost nowhere in the world precisely because it is known to be politically divisive and to undermine the development of political parties. This, in turn, limited the potential for groups focused on shared political agendas to emerge. Third, the highly centralized presidential system created by the 2004 constitution -- which copied many elements of Zahir Shah's 1964 constitution -- did not accommodate Afghanistan's rich diversity and the reality that de facto power is decentralized. These three features of Afghan institutions ensured that a broad-based and inclusive government capable of providing stability, safety, liberty, and economic opportunity to Afghans would not emerge, even with unprecedented levels of international assistance. These exclusionary, divisive, and centralized political institutions were fundamentally out of sync with Afghanistan’s political realities and encumbered the development of an effective state.

Date: 2022-04
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