Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard and Learning

Dirk Bergemann and Ulrich Hege

No 1738, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic agency model. The value of the venture project is initially uncertain and more information arrives by developing the project. The allocation of funds and the learning process are subject to moral hazard. The optimal contract is a time-varying share contract which provides intertemporal risk-sharing between venture capitalist and entrepreneur. The share of the entrepreneur reflects the value of a real option. The option itself is based on the control of the funds. The dynamic agency costs may be high and lead to an inefficiently early end to the project. A positive liquidation explains the adoption of strip financing or convertible securities. Finally, relationship financing, including monitoring and the occasional replacement of management improves the efficiency of the financial contracting.

Keywords: dynamic financial constraints; optimal stopping; relationship finance; Security Design; share contracts; venture financing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 D92 G24 G31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (46)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning (1998)
Working Paper: Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning (1998)
Working Paper: Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard and Learning (1997)
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