The Political Economy of EC Regionalism

Andre Sapir

No 1739, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Many observers have noted a recent proliferation of regional trade agreements primarily centred in or on Europe. The paper analyses the causes and consequences of EC regionalism. It begins by examining the development and importance of the phenomenon. It finds that although the EC maintains preferential trade arrangements with virtually all countries, preferential trade accounts for no more than 25% of total EC trade. The paper investigates the causes of EC regionalism, focusing on the determinants of both the demand by third countries and the supply by the EC. Lastly, it examines future options.

Keywords: Political Economy; Preferential Trading Arrangement; trade liberalisation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The political economy of EC regionalism (1998)
Working Paper: The political economy of EC regionalism (1998)
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