Tax Design, Information, and Elasticities: Evidence From the French Wealth Tax

Bertrand Garbinti, Jonathan Goupille-Lebret, Mathilde Munoz, Stefanie Stantcheva and Gabriel Zucman

No 18206, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study a French wealth tax reform that starkly reduced the information some taxpayers must report to the tax authority. Using a new dynamic bunching approach we estimate the average response to the reform, the share of compliers, and the local average treatment effect. The annual wealth growth rate of treated taxpayers falls by 0.5 percentage points after the reform. This decline is likely due to increased evasion, as suggested by the sharp responses in self-reported wealth but not in third-partyreported incomes. The wealth tax base becomes more elastic post reform, illustrating the key role of information policy choices for tax base elasticities.

Keywords: Wealth taxation; Bunching; Tax design; Behavioral responses (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H23 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-06
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Related works:
Working Paper: Tax Design, Information, and Elasticities: Evidence From the French Wealth Tax (2024)
Working Paper: Tax Design, Information, and Elasticities: Evidence From the French Wealth Tax (2024)
Working Paper: Tax Design, Information, and Elasticities: Evidence From the French Wealth Tax (2023)
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