Antitrust Enforcement Increases Economic Activity

Tania Babina, Simcha Barkai, Jessica Jeffers, Ezra Karger () and Ekaterina Volkova

No 18772, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We hand-collect information describing all 3,055 antitrust lawsuits brought by the Department of Justice (DOJ) between 1971 and 2018. Using confidential U.S. Census microdata, we show that DOJ lawsuits targeting past anticompetitive conduct in local industries cause a persistent 5.4% increase in employment and 4.1% increase in business formation compared to the same industries in other states. We further find (1) a sharp increase in payroll exceeding the increase in employment, (2) an economically and statistically insignificant increase in sales, and (3) a precise increase in the labor share. Our results show that government antitrust enforcement increases economic activity.

JEL-codes: E24 J21 K21 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-01
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Related works:
Working Paper: Antitrust Enforcement Increases Economic Activity (2023)
Working Paper: Antitrust Enforcement Increases Economic Activity (2023)
Working Paper: Antitrust Enforcement Increases Economic Activity (2023)
Working Paper: Antitrust Enforcement Increases Economic Activity (2023)
Working Paper: Antitrust enforcement increases economic activity (2023)
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