A General Measure of Bargaining Power for Non-Cooperative Games

Görlach, Joseph-Simon and Nicolas Motz
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Joseph-Simon Görlach

No 18843, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Despite recent advances, no general methods for computing bargaining power in non-cooperative games exist. We propose a number of axioms such a measure should satisfy and show that they characterise a unique function. The principle underlying this measure is that the influence of a player can be assessed according to how much changes in this player's preferences affect outcomes. Considering specific classes of games, our approach nests existing measures of power. We present applications to cartel formation, the non-cooperative model of the household, and legislative bargaining.

JEL-codes: C72 C78 D01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-02
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Working Paper: A General Measure of Bargaining Power for Non-cooperative Games (2024)
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