Do Politicians Affect Firm Outcomes? Evidence from Connections to the German Federal Parliament

Andre Diegmann, Laura Pohlan and Andrea Weber

No 19119, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study how connections to German federal parliamentarians affect firm dynamics by constructing a novel dataset to measure connections between politicians and the universe of firms. To identify the causal effect of access to political power, we exploit (i) new appointments to the company leadership team and (ii) discontinuities around the marginal seat of party election lists. Our results reveal that connections lead to reductions in firm exits, gradual increases in employment growth without improvements in productivity. The economic effects are mediated by better credit ratings while access to subsidies or procurement contracts are documented to be of lower importance

Keywords: Politicians; Firm performance; Regression discontinuity; Political connections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 L25 O43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP19119 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Do politicians affect firm outcomes? Evidence from connections to the German Federal Parliament (2026)
Working Paper: Do Politicians Affect Firm Outcomes? Evidence from Connections to the German Federal Parliament (2025)
Working Paper: Do Politicians Affect Firm Outcomes? Evidence from Connections to the German Federal Parliament (2025)
Working Paper: Do Politicians Affect Firm Outcomes? Evidence from Connections to the German Federal Parliament (2024)
Working Paper: Do politicians affect firm outcomes? Evidence from connections to the German Federal Parliament (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19119

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP19119

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().