Asymmetric Platform Oligopoly

Martin Peitz and Susumu Sato

No 19584, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We propose a tractable model of asymmetric platform oligopoly with logit demand in which users from two distinct groups are subject to within-group and cross-group network effects and decide which platform to join. We characterize the equilibrium when platforms manage user access by setting participation fees for each user group. We explore the effects of platform entry, a change of incumbent platforms’ quality under free entry, and the degree of compatibility. We show how the analysis can be extended to partial user participation.

Keywords: Oligopoly theory; Aggregative games; Network effects; Two-sided markets; Two-sided single-homing; Entry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-10
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP19584 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Asymmetric Platform Oligopoly (2026)
Working Paper: Asymmetric Platform Oligopoly (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19584

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP19584

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().