Research Waves

Mariagiovanna Baccara, Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin

No 19808, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Competing research waves start and grow as scientists choose their specialization driven by career incentives. We build a strategic experimentation framework where agents irreversibly choose between two risky fields, and information arrives faster as more agents specialize in a field. In the `bad news' case, if no news arrives, all agents join a bandwagon wave into one field. In the `good news' case, both fields are explored in two sequential surges, followed by slow entry into the initially inferior field. We describe how the equilibrium depends on the information-production technology, and assess the impact of first-mover advantages, congestion, and deadlines.

Keywords: Poisson Bandits; Irreversibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 O31 O35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-12
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