Market Design for Distributional Objectives in (Re)assignment: An Application to Improve the Distribution of Teachers in Schools

Julien Combe, Umut Dur, Olivier Tercieux, Camille Terrier and M. Utku Ãœnver

No 19893, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Centralized (re)assignment of workers to jobs is increasingly common in public and private sectors. However, these markets often suffer from distributional problems. We propose a new strategy-proof mechanism that efficiently improves individual and distributional welfare over the status quo. We justify our constructive and practical approach by microfounding it through the theory of inequality measures in welfare economics. To evaluate the performance of our mechanism, we focus on teacher (re)assignment, where the unequal distribution of experienced teachers across schools is a well-documented concern. Using French data, we demonstrate that our mechanism reduces the teacher experience gap across regions more effectively than benchmarks, including the current mechanism, while providing higher average welfare for teachers.

Keywords: Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D50 D61 I21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP19893 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19893

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP19893

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().