Comparing Subsidies to Solve Coordination Failure

Roweno Heijmans and Sigrid Suetens

No 20035, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We use experiments to systematically test the performance of subsidies aimed at inducing efficient coordination in a coordination game. We consider two classes of policies: those based on divide-and-conquer (i.e.\ iterated dominance) and those making the efficient Nash equilibrium of the game risk dominant. Cost-efficient policies from both classes are equally expensive but differ in the distribution of subsidies among agents. Our results show that risk dominance subsidies increase coordination more effectively or at a lower cost than divide-and-conquer subsidies.

JEL-codes: C70 C90 D04 H20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-03
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