When Developers Hold Office: Shaping Housing Supply Through Local Politics

Ghizlen Ouasbaa, Solé-Ollé, Albert and Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal

No 20151, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We examine the impact of city council members with real estate back-grounds on housing supply in California between 1995 and 2019. Using candidate occupation data and a close-elections regression discontinuity design, we find that electing a developer increases approved housing units by 68% during their term, especially for multifamily projects. The effect operates primarily through discretionary zoning approvals and does not persist beyond the developer’s term, suggesting limited impact on broader regulatory reform. These findings offer new causal evidence on how policymakers’ professional backgrounds shape land-use deci-sions and contribute to a long-standing debate on the political origins of housing supply constraints.

JEL-codes: P00 R31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-04
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