Strategic Cops and Robbers?

Giovanni Mastrobuoni and Emily Owens

No 20237, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This study proposes a new framework to investigate whether criminals exhibit strategic behavior in response to the legal and enforcement environment. Utilizing a unique dataset on commercial robberies in Milan from 2008 to 2010, we examine the decisions robbers make regarding weapon choice, number of accomplices, and the type of business targeted. Our analysis explores the relationship between these decisions, the expected return from the robbery, and the probability of arrest, considering the constraints imposed by Italian law, which prescribes differential punishments based on certain criminal choices. We find some evidence that robbers act in accordance with expected utility maximization, particularly when operating in groups. Our findings suggest that at least some robberies are conducted in a way consistent with rational strategic behavior.

Keywords: Police; Crime (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-05
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