Monopolistic Data Dumping

Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler

No 20299, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: A monopolist curates a database for users seeking to learn a parameter's value: "nowcasters" focus on its current value, while "forecasters" target its long-run value. The monopolist designs a menu of contracts described by fees and data-access levels, balancing revenue and data-storage costs. The optimal menu offers full access to historical data, while current data is fully provided to nowcasters but may be withheld from forecasters. Compared to the social optimum, the monopolist oversupplies historical data, undersupplies current data, and may provide excessive data overall.

Keywords: Data; markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-05
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