Can Mass Purges Root out Corruption?

Stephane Wolton, Pinda Wang and Lützenrath, Johannes

No 20522, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study the properties of mass anti-corruption campaigns. To do so, we use a formal model of top-down accountability in which an autocrat faces a mass of agents who can be honest or corrupt and loyal or disloyal (two-dimensional type). Agents can embezzle funds for private gains and exert effort on individual projects. The autocrat values good performance and loses from agents' embezzlement. We show that when the autocrat can easily detect corrupt activities, so that no agent ever embezzles during the campaign, a mass purge always increases the proportion of corrupt agents within the system. Indeed, we highlight how an anti-corruption campaign spillovers into an ideological mass purge. We discuss how our findings help to re-interpret anti-corruption efforts in autocracies, including Xi Jinping's recent purge of the Chinese Communist Party.

JEL-codes: D73 D74 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-08
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