Optimal Merger Remedies

Volker Nocke and Andrew Rhodes

No 20573, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We develop a framework to study horizontal mergers when the parties can propose remedies to an antitrust authority. Remedies are modeled as asset divestitures, which make the firm receiving the assets more efficient at the expense of the merged firm. We consider both the case where the merger affects a single market and where it affects multiple markets. Solving for the merging firms' optimal proposal, we investigate when it involves remedies---and if so, which assets should be divested, and to whom, and how this depends on market characteristics such as the level of competitiveness.

Keywords: Antitrust; Horizontal mergers; Structural remedies; Divestitures; Data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-08
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