Pharmaceutical Regulation and Incentives for Innovation in an International Perspective

Pierre Dubois

No 20728, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We examine pharmaceutical regulations and incentives for innovation from an international perspective, highlighting the public good nature of healthcare innovation and its cross-border diffusion. We summarize the empirical evidence on how push and pull incentives shape R\D investment, innovation, and global access. We emphasize the role of strategic interdependencies and spillovers, including free-riding in R\D financing, learning-by-doing effects, drug shortages, reference pricing, and parallel trade. We then provide new evidence on the international spillovers of pull incentives on innovation, showing that international cooperation and innovative institutions are necessary to better align national regulations with the global objective of sustaining pharmaceutical innovation.

Keywords: Innovation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I10 I11 L10 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-10
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP20728 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:20728

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP20728

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().