 Power Rivalry and Failures in International CooperationAnwesha Banerjee, Ottmar Edenhofer and Ulrike Kornek No 20845, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research Abstract: We study the consequences of power rivalry among countries on the voluntary provision of global public goods. We show that rising prosperity and decreasing inequality between countries do not necessarily lead to an increase in public good provision. Depending upon the characteristics of the public good, either a sole hegemon or a group of hegemonic states emerge as contributors to the public good in equilibrium. The equilibrium total amount of the public good may go down when the assets of countries increase equally, as hegemonic states reduce contributions because they lose relative power. Decreasing between-country inequality in assets can have the same effect. Further, increasing heterogeneity in valuations of the public good increases public good contributions, but may lower overall welfare. Our results show how recent shifts in global economic order may explain the current decline in provision of global public goods such as climate change mitigation, international peacekeeping efforts, and global foreign aid. Keywords: Public goods; Rivalry (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:20845 Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from Access Statistics for this paper More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK. |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.