Who Gets Hired? The Strength of Weak Ties and the Signaling of Strong Ties

Shahir Safi and Yves Zenou

No 20891, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper presents a model of referrals in which strong ties serve as a signaling mechanism, allowing employees to convey private information about referred workers. Matching occurs through three channels: strong ties (partially informative), weak ties (uninformative but frictionless), and formal screening in the market (fully informative but frictional). Low-skill workers use weak ties to avoid revealing their type, helping reconcile two stylized facts: Granovetter1973's strength of weak ties and the prevalence of referrals in low-skill jobs. The model also reveals a complementarity between weak and strong ties: conditional on having a strong-tie offer, returns to weak ties are positive and increasing in worker skill.

Date: 2025-12
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